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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?

The intelligence community, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the last quarter century, intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency which goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the \$4 to \$6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Directorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business-as-usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy—which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of Government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today? □

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is reported to have a budget of about \$700-million to \$1-billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed to fully prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized CIA to:

"perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence

agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;

"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." (italics added)

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be plausible and deniable by the Government.

Even this authority has been exceeded since several impossible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The National Security Act gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions . . ." But another secret Executive Branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of *knowing* as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:

"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would just collect intelligence. The budget was only \$100 million.

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